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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

--------------------

I

I
I

fTATE OF UTAH,

Respondent,

)

)

--vs--

)

IWAYNE PEARSON,

)

Appellant.

Case No. 10057

)

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATE.MENT OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged pursuant to an
information charging him of violation of Title
?6, Chapter 50, Section 2,

Utah Code Annotated,

l953, Escape from the Utah State Prison.
was tried on the 7th day of October,

He

1963, in

- 2 I

~he

i

'Third Judicial District Court in front of

1udge

and Jury.
DISPOSITION MADE BY THE LOWER COURT

i
i

The jury rendered a verdict of guilty.

The

!Appellant was sentenced for not less than one
I

!year and not more than ten years to commence at
:the expiration of the sentence for which he is
!now incarcerated.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Reversal of Trial Court's judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On May 22, 1963, in broad daylight,
Appellant escaped from the Utah State Prison,
climbing two fences amid gunfire, and driving

away in a visitor• s au to.

The next day he

surrendered to the Assistant Warden (T-18).
Appellant testified in his own behalf
(T-20).

He stated that two weeks before he had

had a fight with an inmate over a radio,
Which Appellant had accidently broken.

A

few days later he,

3 -

"was beat up,"

(T-21).

Appellant reported this incident to
.Officer Cole, a guard, and Lieutenant Coleman
i

. (T-22).

He had tried to see the Warden (T-23);

. tried to be put in isolation (T-23); thought his
1

life was in danger (T-23).

He was informed that

he could not be moved until the Deputy Warden's

okay came through (T-23).

After being beaten up again by five
individuals, he again contacted a guard; but
~e

guard on duty could not contact Lieutenant

Coleman (T-24, 25) .

On another occasion he

was informed that he could not be moved "with-

out cause," and was told he should kick out a

Window.

He was beaten up again (T-25) .

Immediately before Appellant escaped, he
~ias

knifed (T-26), and told by two or three

inmates,

"We 1 11 kill you! "

He then ran through

the Chapel, hiding there a few minutes from

- 4 his pursuers
the fences

(T-28-34), and proceeded across

(T-28-34) .

During cross-examination, Appellant stated
that he had not been planning the escape for a
considerable time, but only that night.

He

said that he had thought about escaping with
the three beatings, but left only when "that
knife came out,"

(T-29).

The court refused to allow Appellant to
answer the question whether he felt that if he
did not escape that he would be killed

(T-32).

The court, taking the position that the
Appellant had to be pursued by someone at the
instance that he escaped before the defense of
coercion could be raised,
front of the jury),

further stated (in

"If I am cornered, and I

have to go over the fence to escape with my
life, that is justification.
over a period of three days,

If I am threatened
I don 1 t think that

-

is.
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The defense then established that the

time was ten minutes after Appellant was knifed
(T-32) that he went over the fence.
Appellant admitted that after going over
the first fence he could have stopped, but did
not.

The reason given was that he was only

thinking of getting away (T-35) •
After the defense rested, the trial judge,
on motion of the prosecutor, instructed the

jury to disregard the Appellant's testimony as
to coercion and duress.

The Court further

refused Appellant's proposed jury instruction
in this regard.
STATE.MENT OF POINTS
POINT ONE:
THE COURT ERRED IN STRICKING APPELLANT'S
TESTIMONY AS TO COERCION.

POINT TWO:
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT
THE JURY AS TO COERCION.

- 6 ARGUE.MENT OF THE POINTS
Even though there are two points of appeal,
they are both concerning the trial court 1 s
attitude toward the defense of coercion; and
the same law applies.

They will be treated

together for the purpose of this brief.
Utah Code Annotated, 76-1-41, provides,
"All persons are capable of committing
crimes except those belonging to the
following classes: • • . 9:
1

Persons, unless the crime is punishable
with death, who commit the act or make
the omission charged under threats or
menaces sufficient to show that they
have reasonable cause to believe, and
do believe, their lives will be
endangered if they refuse. 111

Appellant's Instruction No. 1, refused by
llie trial judge, stated:
"A person is not capable of committing
a crime when the action done was done
under threats or means sufficient to
show that the defendant had reasonable
cause to believe and did believe that
his life would be endangered if he
refused. 11

•
-

7 -

May i t be noted that the Instruction quotes
ilie statute; hence,
the Instruction,

arguement to the effect that

if not the law, would not be

well taken.

Generally the courts have said that by
common law the defense of coercion is available
except in capital cases, but that to constitute

llie defense the coercion must be present,
imminent, and impending, and of such a nature
as

to induce a well-grounded apprehension of

death or serious bodily injury if the act is
not done.
This court must decide if under our statute
there must be imminentness.

Our legislature

seems to base the criteria on "reasonableness 11

rather than imminentness.

Reasonableness is a

:nuch better criteria, which might include

imminentness, but which is broader.

However,

"'en where imminentness is required the courts

--

8 -

.1ave held that coercion is a jury question
1xcept in cases where imminentness is obviously
lacking.
State v St. Clair,
15, was a robbery case,
~fundant

(Mo., 1953), 262, SW 2nd,
the Classical one:

claimed if he did not go along, he

would be killed.

'I1he court, in a very good

focision, goes into the law stating imminentness
as the criteria,

and whether or not defendant

could have avoided the criminal act.

'I1he court

reversed and remanded stating that the question
is one for the jury.

In White v State,

(Tex., 1947), 203 P 2nd,

222, again the Classical robbery case where

defendant feared death if he did not participate,
the court states:

"Whether (the defendant) was under
duress or merely pretended to be
was a question of fact to be solved
by the jury."

-

9 -

The case held the trial court in error for not
so instructing.
The courts have more trouble when they get
away from the case book example.
v Reffitt,

In Commonwealth

(Ky., 1912), 149 Ky. 300, 148 SW 48,

the defendant sold pooled tobacco and claimed
that he originally joined the pool because he
was afraid of the ''N;ight Raiders," a local
pooled tobacco group,

that had done some burning

and whipping in the area.

The court held that

coercion was a jury question.

It is noted that

imminentness is not gone into in this case, nor
were defendant• s fears overt.

The threat was

a silent one coming from the "Raiders'" actions
to other non-pooled farmers.

The court felt

that the question of duress was best left to
the jury.

Perhaps the local citizenry knew

rnore about the "Night Raiders" than did the

judges.

10 -

The sutle threats of the "Night

Raiders" might be compared to the sutle threats
of idle inmates at the Utah State Prison, who

have been known to fulfill their threats by
severing a man's head,
2nd67,

in half,

(State v Garcia, 11 Ut.

355 Pac. 2nd, 57), and cutting them
(State v Langley, unreported).

People v Mcclinton,
~,

'

1

j

'.

'·,

(Mich., 1916), 160

465, was a perjury action where the

defendant claimed that he lied the first time
he testified because of police officers•
threats.

The court reversed saying the defense

of coercion is a jury question.
In People v Otis,

(Cal., 1959), 344 P 2,

142, the defendant was found guilty of possession :-l"
,>fa knife in prison.

His defense was that being

1in prison he was afraid that other prisoners

~.·

~

., ~'

' ~-

- 11 1ight harm him; and he needed the protection of
i

knife.

The Supreme Court of California felt

,hat this was not imminent.

However, it is

Qointed out that the trial court did give an
instruction on duress in this case; but not as
liberal as the defense desired.
The defense of duress and coercion should
not be limited to the classical case where a
man holds a gun on the defendant and orders him

,to commit a crime.

!

I

Duress and coercion may be

sutle, for example, where the defendant is left

with no other alternative to save his life, but
to commit a crime.

Self preservation may lead

us to do an act which not under such coercion
~uld

be criminal.

At least the defendant

should be able to put his theory of the case
to a jury and let them determine whether or
not his story is reasonable.

- 12 CONCLUSION
The defense of coercion and duress, as
asked for in Appellant 1 s instructions was a way
?erhaps of saying that the Appellant has a right

:o the defense of self-defense.
the right to kill his agressor,
~1e

Appellant had
(a crime) ; hence,

should be able to commit a lessor crime to

:scape from his agressor.

If one were to jay

I

i11alk or run a stop sign to get away from an
i

!agressor, no one would critize.

The fact that

:this Appellant climbed a fence at the Utah State
I

I

Prison should not be any different.
Respectfully submitted,
MITSUNAGA AND ROSS
Attorneys for Appellant
231 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah

